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I. Introduction: Similarities between the 1920s and the 
1990s 
An historical perspective sometimes can be an  aid to under- 
standing current issues. Corporate governance, which has been 
attracting the attention of economists, lawyers and policy makers. 
is one of those issues. In this paper, I look back a t  the pre-war 
history of corporate governance in Japan, and discuss its 
implications for today. 
I t  is orten argued that there are similarities between the 
Japanese economy in the 1920s and in the 1990s. In the 1910s. 
the Japanese economy grew rapidly during the First World War. 
and a t  the same time. a sharp rise in asset prices took place. The 
stock price index in 1919 was 2.29 times higher than that in 1914, 
and the land price index in 1919 was 2.78 times higher than that 
in 1915.1 However, asset prices collapsed in March 1920, followed 
by a long downward trend until the early 1930s. Asset prices and 
commodity prices a t  the trough of the depression in the early 
1930s were only one-third to a half of those at. the peak. 
Prolonged deflation seriously damaged the balance sheets of firms 
and banks, leading to a major bank panic in 1927. 
Such phenomena a s  the asset price bubble, prolonged deflation 
and financial crisis impress on us  the similarities between the 
1920s and the 1990s, but these phenomena arguably reflect a 
more critical similarity. That is, in both periods the system of 
corporate governance in Japan was faced with a crisis and a 
bifurcation. The deteriorating financial states of banks and 
businesses in the 1920s suggest that the system of corporate 
governance, which had supported economic development since the 
late 1890s. had begun to fail. Economist Kamekichi Takahashi 
correctly stressed this point after the First World War. In his book. 
he comprehensively discussed the problems caused by the 
organization of the joint-stock company (Takahashi 1930). This 
book contains many insights that are still meaningful, 1-oday. 
Takahashi attributed the crisis of the Japanese economy in the 
1920s to the decay of corporate management, which, in turn, was 
attributed to the myopia and selfishness of large shareholders and 
the decadence of corporate directors. "Shareholder myopia" refers to 
I Industry Promotion Bank (1937). 
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the fact that shareholders preferred dividends ahead of p r o 3  
reserves, R&D and reinvestment. "Decadence of corporate directors" 
refers to lack of managerial capability, large executive bonuses, arid 
breaches of trust (pp. 4-5). I t  implies that Takahashi correctly 
recognized the problems in corpori3te governance. 
Here. I want to focus on the countern~easures that Takahashi 
proposed, based on the above recogrlition. He suggested two 
alternative systems of corporate governance. The first alternati~~e 
was "transferring the governance of corporations to the major 
zaibatsu including Mitsui and hlitsubishi, and utilizing the thcir 
credit and managerial capabilities." The second alternative wiis 
"having financial institutions control industrial corporat.ions, and 
utilizing the credit and managerial capabilities of their personnel" 
(ibid. pp. 8-9). This proposal implies that Takahashi regarded major 
zaibatsu and banks a s  candidates fir  the job of corporate 
governance. As history eventually would reveal, his thinking h ~ ~ d  
great relevance. 
11. Zaibatsu as a System of C!orporate Governance 
Takaha-shi grounded the first alternative in the fact that 
management of companies affiliated to the major zaibatsu was 
relatively sound. compared to that. of non-affiliated companies. This 
viewpoint, seeing zaibatsu from1 the perspective of corporate 
governance, is noteworthy. but it has not influenced the Iiteratui-e 
about zaibatsu. This is basically due to research on zaibat5.u 
focusing on the "monopoly" aspect.. 
For Ma.rxist economists, who have been prominent in research cln 
zaibatsu, it was almost self-evident t.hat zaibatsu represented 
"monopoly capital." Also, the U.S.  occupat.ion authorities, which Ir:d 
the reforms after the Second World War, regarded zaibatsu as 
"large Japanese industrial and banking combines or other 1arf;e 
concentrations of private business control," and therefore entities :o 
be dissolved.2 Indeed. in discussions about lifting the ban on 
holding companies in the 1990~, even those who were posit i~~e 
about such a move negatively evaluated the zaibatsu's pre-war role 
'SWNCC:. "Basic Directive for Post-Surrender. Military Govenirrlent in 
,Japan Proper." (Financial History Section. Ministry of Finance 1982. p. 170). 
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(The Small Committee for Basic Issues, The Industrial Structure 
Council 1993). Williamson (1985) classified the literature on 
organizations and institutions into the "efficiency approach" and the 
"monopoly approach [pp. 22-9). Using this framework, we can say 
that most of the literature on zaibatsu has been based on the 
monopoly approach. On the other hand, Takahashi (1930) was a 
pioneer of zaibatsu research based on the efficiency approach. 
Reviewing the history of zaibatsu from the efficiency perspective, 
we find that it is replete with efforts to deal with agency problems, 
particularly those relating to corporate governance. Organizational 
reforms of zaibatsu for governing businesses can be traced back to 
the Tokugawa Era. Mitsui, which became the largest zaibatsu after 
the Meiji Restoration, had already diversified its businesses into 
kimono retailing and banking during the Tokugawa Era. Also, each 
of these businesses was carried on by a number of branches 
located in outlying areas (Yasuoka 1979, p. 68). The Mitsui family 
proprietors found it difficult to ensure that those branches were 
managed in accordance with their interests. In other words, they 
were faced with an agency problem. 
To cope with the agency problem, Mitsui in the early 18th 
century established in Kyoto an institution called Omotokata. 
Every year, Omotokata would entrust a certain amount of capital to 
each branch, which invested it on behalf of the business. From the 
profit earned, each branch returned a fixed sum of money (kudoku) 
to Omotokata, 10% of the remaining profit was distributed among 
employees of the branch, and 90% reserved a t  the branch. While 
the branch manager had discretion in utilizing the funds, 
Omotokata administered his personal performance (Mitsui Bunko 
1980, pp. 96-102). The efficiency of each branch was measured 
according to the amount of capital provided and the profit earned, 
and used to evaluate the branch manager. Thus, an incentive 
scheme for each branch to enhance its efficiency was built into this 
system. The organizational structure and the incentive system re- 
sembled the multi-divisional organization of the modem corporation. 
After the Meiji Restoration, wealthy families, including Mitsui and 
lwasaki (Mitsubishi), diversified their businesses into various 
modern industries, and thereby grew to become zaibatsu. 
Meanwhile, not only did the number of businesses increase, but 
also the scale of each business was expanded, and more complex 
technologies came to be utilized. These changes exacerbated the 
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agency problem. In order to resolve the problem, major zaibats~! 
carried out organizational reforms. They established holding 
companies and made their businesses independent joint-stocl.: 
companies, whose stocks were mainly owned by the hold in^ 
companies. 
The holding company of a zaibatsu not only held the stocks of 
the asfilialled companies, it also had several devices to monitor 
them. Cor-poratization of the businesses in itself implied easier 
assessment of their performances. In many cases, holding 
companies assigned staff member.:; to the affiliated companies as 
directors. With respect to Mitsui and Mitsubishi, every decision 
rnade in board meetings of affiliated companies had to be approvec 
by the holding company ex anic?. In addition, with respect tc' 
Mitsubishi, the budget and settlement of the accounts of the 
affiliated companies were approved by the holding company ex ante 
On the other hand, the holding company had an internal 
organization for monitoring the affil~ated companies. Mitsui Holdings 
had the Inspection Section, which examined the reports filed by 
auditors of the affiliated companie:;,. And. Mitsubishi Holdings had 
the Monitl~ring Section, which uri:~s responsible for auditing the 
accounts and businesses of the affiliated companies. 
How effective were those monitoring systerns? This is a question 
to be tested empirically. Here. I would like to show the result of a 
regression analysis in Okazaki (2001). The samples are 1 3 5  firms 
whose paid-in capital in 1936-7 was greater than one million yen. 
and whose financial data from 1921 to 1936 are available. 01 
these. we can identify 30 zaibatsu-affiliated firms. according tc 
classification by the Holding Company liquidation Cornmittet 
(1951). I pooled the data from 1921 to 1936 to arrive a t  2,025 
observations. Then, I regressed the return on equity (ROE) to 
paid-in capital, industry dummies, year dummies and a dummy 
variable capturing zaibatsu-affiliated firms (ZAIBATSU).3 The result 
is reported in Table 1. As the coeffxcient of ZAIBATSU indicates, thc 
ROE of the zaibatsu firms was 3.651% points higher than that of 
non-zaibaksu firms, on average. '[he difference in ROE between 
zaibatsu and non-zaibatsu firms i:i substantial, and the result is 
statistically significant. 
3 Here, we include nine major zaibatsu: Mitsui, Mitsubishi. Sumitorno 
Sasutla. Asano. Nissan. Furukawa. Okura, and Nornura. 
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TABLE 1
REGRESSION ANALYSIS OF ROE 
(1) (2) (3) 
Constant 10.559 (7.001)"* 4.310 (1.693)' 4.169 (1.589) 
CAPITAL -0.019 (-1.876)* -0.025 (-2.490)"* -0.003 (-2.499)" 















 ad-^* 0.0099 0.031 1 
Notes: 1) Each equation includes year dummies. but not reported. 
2) t-values in parentheses. 
3) *** Significant at 1% level. 
** Significant a t  5% level. 
* Significant a t  10% level. 
4) HCI refers to the dummy variable which equals 1. if a company 
was in the heavy and chemical industries (metal, machinery and 
chemical), and 0, otherwise. 
This result suggests that zaibatsu holding companies effectively 
governed the affiliated companies to ensure that they maintained 
high profitability. There might be an alternative interpretation that 
the high profitability of zaibatsu firms reflects their monopoly 
powers. However, because we controlled for industry dummies here. 
a t  least if we focus on the effect of a monopoly in raising market 
prices. this alternative interpretation does not hold, because the 
effect of the raised market prices was exerted on all of the firms in 
the same market. 
It is noteworthy that the monitoring function of the zaibatsu 
holding company worked not only inside the zaibatsu group, but 
also affected companies outside the group. In the 1920s and early 
1930s. during a prolonged depression, zaibatsu actively took over 
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poorly performing companies, and assigned directors to restructure 
them. In other words, zaibatsu contributeti to resolving problems 
attributable to weakness in the system of corporate governance. 
Interestingly, Gisuke Ayukawa, founder of the Nissan zaibatsu, 
likened the corporate restructuring function of Nissan to tke 
function of a gardener. In his analogy, Nissan bought various seeds 
and young plants, and raised ttit:m by letting them bathe in tl-e 
sun,  and by supplying water allti fertilizer. If the plantirlgs bole 
flowers and fruit. Nissan distributed these to its shareholders. And, 
if a rare tree or a potentially good plant stagnating in the shac.e 
were identified, Nissan bought it cheaply for cultivation by changing 
soils and grooming. Furthermore, it possessed the skill of grafting 
to enable plum flowers to blossom on a peach tree. (Ayukama 
1937. pp. 165-6). 
Let me illustrate the restructuring function of zaibatsu, using tke 
example of Nippon Flour Mills (Okazaki 2001). Nippon Flour Mi1l:j. 
established in 1896, was a major player in the flour industry, alorg 
with Nisshin Flour Milling. In thr. early 1920s. Nippon Flour Mil s 
developed a relationship with Suzuki Shoten, a major trading 
company, which had flourished during World War I. As its financial 
situation worsened, the company became dependent on Suzuki. In 
1922. Su:auki became the major sl-iareholcler with a 13.1% holding. 
Ir i  the 1920s. the return on ecluity (ROE.) of Nippon Flour Mil:s 
was around 10% but this was lower than the average return for 
the overall food industry and that of Nisshin Flour Milling, another 
major flour company. Furthermorc:, failure of wheat speculation In 
1924 adversely affected Nippon IT'lour Mills' business. To a d d r e ~ ~ s  
this situation, the company entered into a merger contract with 
Nisshin Flour Milling in October 1926. but shortly afterward 
Nisshin refused to merge, on the grounds that Nippon Flour Mills' 
debt was larger than expected. 'The stock price of Nippon Flour 
Mills fell from 54.0 yen in October 1926 1.0 13.4 yen in J a n u a ~ y  
1927. Alfjo, it became difficult to have Nippon Flour Mills' bills 
discounted. 
In response to a petition by Suicuki, Taiwan Bank, a semi- publ~c 
bank that had a close relationship with Suzuki, provided a rescue 
loan. Nippon Flour Mills reduced its capital by 75O/0 to clear the 
deficit, then increased the capital again to cover its debt to Suzuki. 
T11i:i process resulted in Suzuki's stockholtlirig rising to 72.8%. At 
tlie samc time, Komakichi Kubota, head of Suzuki's Tokyo branch. 
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was installed a s  president of Nippon Flour Mills, and two directors 
were assigned from Suzuki and Taiwan Bank. Nippon Flour Mills 
embarked on a restructuring exercise under the control of Suzuki 
and Taiwan Bank. 
However, almost immediately, the 1927 financial crisis sent both 
Suzuki and Taiwan Bank bankrupt, and the restructuring scheme 
for Nippon Flour Mills collapsed. In response, Nippon Flour Mills 
sought help from Mitsui & Co. (Mitsui Bussan), with which it had 
a trade connection. In March 1928, a new board of directors was 
installed, with Yunosuke Yasukawa, executive director of Mitsui & 
Co., a s  chairman. Five of the seven directors were affiliated to 
Mitsui & Co., including chairman Yasukawa and executive director 
Toichi Nakamura. The shares in Nippon Flour Mills held by Taiwan 
Bank were bought by Mitsui & Co. for 25 yen each. Consequently, 
Mitsui & Co. became the dominant shareholder with over 60% of 
the stock. 
Under the control of Mitsui & Co., Nippon Flour Mills reformed 
its organization, concentrating power in the head office, which 
assumed control of procurement, marketing and finance for the 
whole company. Also, the head office system for monitoring 
branches was reinforced. Following acquisition by Mitsui & Co., the 
performance of Nippon Flour Mills improved sharply. In 1929, ROE 
surpassed the average for the food industry, and in 1932 it 
overtook that of Nisshin Flour Milling. The stock price also rose 
substantially. Using 76.3 yen a s  a t  1935 a s  a benchmark, it is 
calculated that the 48,000 shares Mitsui & Co. bought in 1928 
achieved a capital gain of 2,460 thousand yen. 
The role of zaibatsu in takeovers and corporate restructuring is 
worth emphasizing in the following sense: Neoclassical economics 
sets high store by the role of capital market in corporate gover- 
nance. The stock price of a poorly performing company declines. 
which increases the probability of a takeover. Actual and potential 
takeovers help to make a company more efficient. However, as  
Williamson (1975) stressed, for this mechanism to works effectively 
there need to be potential takeover raiders able to evaluate and 
take over the poorly performing businesses. Williamson believed 
that M-form companies were raider candidates. In pre-war Japan, 
zaibatsu with holding companies fulfilled this role. Zaibatsu not 
only built the internal capital market, but also enhanced the 
efficiency of the external capital market (Okazaki 2001). 
Difference from the Difference from the Stock price of 
Paid-in capital ROE average of the foods average of Nisshin Stock price Nisshin Flour 
industry Flour Milling Milling 
thousand yen %/year %/year %/year Yen Yen 
Note: The shadow denotes the year of acquisition. 
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111. The War Economy: Choosing a Fork in the Road 
What has occurred in the Japanese corporate sector since the 
1920s implies that the system of corporate governance actually 
started to proceed in the first direction, suggested by Takahashi 
(1930). While the system centered on individual shareholders no 
longer worked well. a new system based on zaibatsu holding 
companies was emerging. However, this process suddenly ceased, 
and the system of corporate governance began to proceed in the 
alternative direction, i.e., toward a system based on banks. As I 
discussed in several earlier papers, the incentive for a change of 
direction in the system of corporate governance was the experiences 
of the Second World War (Okazaki 1994, 1997, 1999a). 
In order to prosecute the war, the government implemented a 
number of strong measures that had not been available in 
peacetime. These measures altered the constraints on private 
companies, and thereby changed their behavior. The changes 
transformed the corporate system in Japan. Effects of the war 
economy on the evolution of the corporate governance system were 
twofold: It impeded the first alternative (zaibatsu holding 
companies-based system), and simultaneously promoteti the second 
alternative (bank-based system). 
During the war, the system of corporate governance wherein 
shareholders commanded significant power conflicted with manage- 
ment of the war economy with respect to income distribution and 
productivity incentives. As a result, the government criticized the 
conventional view of companies being centered on shareholder 
sovereignty, and promoted the alternative view that management 
should be separated from capital, and that a company was an 
organic entity comprising shareholders, managers and employees. In 
reality, dividends were regulated, and the link between the 
executive bonus and corporate profit was severed by regulations on 
the executive bonus. Finally, in 1943 the Munitions Corporation Lctw 
restricted the rights of shareholders as  prescribed in the Com- 
mercial Code, and protected the positions of corporate executives 
against the shareholders. While the power of the shareholders was 
restricted, many employees were promoted to directorships. 
These reforms had a significant influence on the financial system. 
Restriction of the powers of shareholders reduced incentives for 
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investors in the capital market, which in turn resulted in rnarkct 
contraction. Meanwhile, the government urgently needed to expand 
the production capacities of the munitions industries. Therefore, it 
promoted an  alternative system for corporate finance, namely, 
indirect finance through banks. 
However. major banks, seeking to avoid risk, were not enthusi- 
astic about providing large loans t.o a limited number of co~npanie:i. 
So, the government introduced the following new method of indirect 
finance: The Industrial Bank of Japan (IBJ), which was a 
semi-publlic bank and had expertise in industrial finance, joined 
with leading private banks to establish an organization for offering 
syndicate loans, Jikyoku Kyodo Y~lshidan (Emergency Joint Lending 
Group). A company wishing to raise funds would apply to one of 
the Group's branches. The IBJ and the bank that was already a 
major lender to the applicant company, would jointly examine the 
application. Then, based on the examinal.ion, a syndicate loan was 
organized by the member banks of the Group (Teranishi 1999). 
This system was superseded in 1.942 by the system of syndicate 
loans ~nediated by Zenkoku Kin'gu Toseikai (the National Finawe 
Control Association), which was led by lhe Bank of Japan. Wiile 
syndicate loans enabled banks to diversify credit risk, delegated 
monitoring contributed to maintaining the ability to oversee their 
performance. Corresponding to the increasing role of banks in 
corporate finance, major banks from 194 1 progressively introduced 
credit analysis sections, separate from their loan sections, since 
1941. T h i ~  series of events suggest that a new system of corpora1.e 
finance, centered on banks, emerged, substituting for the capital 
market. which had played the major role before the war. 
Policies in the latter stages of the war had a further impact on 
the financial system. In 1944. the government designated a spec if.^ 
bank for each munitions companiy, and d e  facto obliged the bank 
to provide loans on request 1:Designatetl Financial Institution 
System). At the same time, the profitability and security of th.e 
munition:; companies were protected by the government through 
price control with subsidies. These policies altered the attitudes of 
banks that had not been keen tlo concentrate loans with a small 
number of companies. Major banks compet.ed to be the designated 
banks of munitions companies. and supplied massive amounts of 
funds to those companies (Okazaki 1999a, 1999b). 
What i~npact did the post-war reforms by the U.S. occupation 
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authorities have on the evolution of the system of corporate 
governance? The reform action directly related to corporate 
governance was dissolution of zaibatsu. As stated above, the 
occupation authorities, regarding zaibatsu as  monopoly capital, 
totally dissolved them. The holding companies were liquidated, and, 
in order to preserve the effects of the reform, an article banning 
holding company was inserted into the Antitrust Law in 1947. 
Dissolution of zaibatsu and the ban on holding companies 
destroyed the organizational basis of corporate governance that had 
worked and was developing in the pre-war period. Numerous small 
shareholders, who emerged as a result of the zaibatsu dissolution, 
had neither incentive nor ability to monitor companies. On the 
other hand, banks, alternative candidates for governance of 
companies, not only had accumulated know-how in corporate 
governance and finance during the war, but had also become 
deeply committed to certain companies through the provision of 
massive loans under the Designated Financial Institution System. 
Most of the loans carried over from wartime to the post-war 
period became non-performing, because the government canceled 
payments to the munitions corporations, on the instructions of the 
occupation authorities. In order to dispose of these non-performing 
loans and restructure the balance sheets of banks and companies. 
the Emergency Measures on Corporate Accounting Law, Corporation 
Reconstruction Law, and Financial Institution Reconstruction Law 
were enacted in 1946. Under these laws, banks took control of the 
companies for which they had worked as  designated financial 
institutions, for the purpose of restructuring those businesses. 
Separating existing non-performing loans from the accounts of 
those companies, the banks provided new funding to the companies 
by way of syndicate loans. If a company needed a loan, the bank 
that had the closest relationship with the company examined the 
loan application, and then asked the Bank of Japan (BOJ) to 
mediate a syndicate loan with other banks. Through mediation by 
the BOJ, a network of delegated monitoring was created (Okazaki 
1996). 
The governance function of the banks worked most dramatically 
in the process whereby the Japanese economy transitioned to a 
market economy, after 1949. Before that time, most companies 
were overstaffed a s  a result of labor union pressure of labor 
unions, and of soft budget constraints, due to government controls 
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and subsidies. When government controls were removed and soft 
budget constraints disappeared, the ba11k:j participating in thr, 
syndicate loans actively intervened with corporate management to 
reduce overstaffing. The fact that banks, rather than shareholders. 
took the initiative when companies ran into problems indicates that 
banks hacl greater incentive and ability to govern businesses. It car1 
be interpreted as  a natural seleclion of mechanisms of corporatr: 
governance (Okazaki 2004). It is well known that the function of 
corporate governance has been (carried out by main banks iri 
post-war Japan (Aoki anti Patrick 1994). The system of corporatr: 
governance characterizing post-war Japan can be viewed a s  ari 
historical consequence of the divergence that appeared during thv 
Second World War. 
IV. Institutional Complementa.rity and Path Dependence 
The changes in corporate govenrlance anti finance were comple- 
inented with changes in other facets of the economy, particularly i r ~  
the emp10,yment system. From 1936, the employment system facet1 
serious problems, including a shortage of skilled workers, activr: 
inter-company transfer of workers and labor disputes. In order to 
increase the supply of skilled workers, the Factory and Establish- 
ment Skilled Workers Training Act in 1939 obliged large factories to 
offer three years' training to a certain nurnber of young workers. It 
is noteworthy that the Act set forth the attributes skilled workers 
were expected to acquire. They were not. specialized workers but 
mu1t.i-skillmed workers, and were expected to perform their work 
efficiently without supervision. Th~ts ,  the skilled workforce that the 
government aimed to foster was similar t.o the workers with 
"intellectui~l skills" in today's Japan (Koike 1994). Toyota Auto- 
mobile Co., in 1939 launched a three-year training course in 
accordance with the Factory anti Establishment Skilled Worker:;. 
'7'raining Act. Toyota (1958. pp. 213-4) wrote, "we had a s  man:y. 
regular t.rainees as  the Act prescribed, and other newcomers were 
given training of two to three months' duration. This practicc 
continued until the end of the war." 
In order to maintain the incentive for companies to train 
employees, it was necessary to restrict inter-company transfers of 
workers. Therefore, the government suppressed inter-compan:f 
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transfers of skilled male workers by means of the Employment 
Restriction Act in 1939, and the Workers Transfer Restriction Act in 
1940. However, this policy produced an unintended side effect. The 
restriction of inter-company transfers deprived workers of an  option 
for resolving grievances against the firm. That is, they could not 
resolve their grievances by way of "exits" from the company. As a 
result, their grievances accumulated within the company, which in 
turn sparked active labor disputes. I t  was necessary to introduce 
an alternative mechanism for resolving workers' grievances. This 
was sangyo hokokukai (sanpo, industrial patriotic society) estab- 
lished in each factory in accordance with government guidelines. 
The major function of sanpo was to organize committees, 
comprising all employees and managers for discussion of such 
issues as labor conditions and productivity. We can interpret sanpo 
as a mechanism for providing a "voice" to workers who had lost the 
option of "exits." Actually, prefecture level data confirm that the 
proportion of sanpo members among total workers was negatively 
associated with the proportion of participants in labor disputes. I t  
was also found that sanpo enhanced the productivity of the 
business (Okazaki 2003). 
The influence of restrictions on labor transfers ranged further. 
The restrictions necessitated introduction of a mechanism to 
determine wages that was alternative to the market mechanism. In 
1939, wage control was introduced, initially as  regulation of the 
wages of unskilled workers. In 1942. the government replaced 
direct wage controls with a system of approving the internal wage 
regimes of individual companies. The government provided 
guidelines for companies to develop their own internal promotion 
rules, and to give all employees an annual raise. This measure led 
to proliferation of wage seniority structures among companies 
(Odaka 1999). 
How was production organized on the shop floor during the war? 
Aoki (1996) proposed a hypothesis that severe wartime conditions. 
such as shortages of labor, capital and raw materials, required 
workers on the shop floor to take appropriate steps according to 
their own judgment, which led to ambiguous job demarcation and 
team-oriented shop floor organization. This hypothesis is consistent 
with actual production management practice during the war. In 
aircraft manufacturing, the largest wartime industry, a production 
management system called suishinko (propelling warehouse) method 
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was introduced. This involved organizing the shop floor on the 
basis of ~1nit.s called suishinkn, which were entrusted with 
considerable authority in production management. The background 
to this decentralized management system was that the existing 
rnet.110~1, whereby the central management unit hierarchically 
controllecl production, could not respond to frequent design changes 
(Wada 1996. pp. 102-5). Ju s t  as  the planning systern of the 
national economy was decentraliz~:.d in the latter stages of the war 
(Okazalu 1997), shop floor managcxrrient was also decentralized. 
The shop floor situation described above was dependent cn 
workers being multi-skilled. In fact, a 1942 survey by the Japan 
Society $or the Promotion of S(:i.ence revealed that workers were 
capable of moving between tasks to compensate vacancies on the 
shop floor. One factory reported that it had workers with the slulls 
to l~andlt. more than two jobs.4 B,lue-collar workers arguably closcd 
the gap with white-collar employees in the sense that they hetl 
intellectual skills (Koike 1994). ~Conversely, white-collar engineei-s 
needed to have detailed knowledgr of the shop floor, in order to l)e 
able to a13just designs to suit actual production conditions. 
Those wartime experiences gave a path-dependent characteristic 
to the evolution of the corporate: systern in the post-war periol-1. 
Following enactment of the Labor Union Law in 1945, labor unior~s 
proliferated rapidly. Although the Law did not prescribe what for 11 
a labor union should take, most unions were organized by 
establishment or by company, and includetl white-collar employec:~ 
as  well as blue-collar worker!;. It is hard to explain t.his 
phenome:non without taking into account wartime experiences. 
First, eniployees were familiar srith the organization for "voice," 
comprising both white-and blue-collar workers, through the 
experience of sanpo. Second, the![ shared a common interest. N3t  
only white-collar employees, but also blue-collar workers had 
firm-specific skills, as a result of various experiences during the 
war, when they were locked int.0 their companies, and receivcd 
training inside those companies. [!sing the legal framework providcd 
by the occupation authorities, thr:y set up  organizations to protert 
* ~ h t .  S.xter~itll Special Committee for tht: Improvement of Industric~s. 
L>el:~art~rir~nt of Science. Japan Society for the Promotion of  Scienc,c. 
"l<csearc.h O I I  tlle Conveyur Systen~ in Japan and Application of its 
Pr-ir~cil~lcs." irk Okuda and Sasaki (1 9'3 7). 
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their company-specific assets. 
Many of the companies that were restructured through 
interventions by banks grew rapidly in the 1950s and 1960s. 
During this process, the Japanese economy periodically faced 
tightening of monetary policy, due to the current account deficit. 
Firms weathered the tight-money conditions with supported from 
the banks, which resulted in bank-company relationships becoming 
closer. Loan syndicates, which initially had been explicit, came to 
be implicit by the early 1960s (Okazaki 1996, pp. 51-21. Meanwhile, 
companies were cautious about recruiting new employees, because 
the labor unions strongly resisted employment adjustment in the 
early 1950s. This caused companies to operate short-handed, 
which, in turn. necessitated fostering workers with multiple skills, 
and making job demarcation ambiguous (Fujimoto 1996, pp. 
259-363). 
Developments in the systems of corporate finance and 
governance, and in the employment system, complemented each 
other. On one hand, the fact that a company's competitiveness 
flowed from the intangible firm-specific skills of employees, made 
the bank-company relationship more advantageous than the 
arms-length system of corporate finance. On the other hand, it was 
difficult for a company to commit to long-term employment without 
having a long-term financial relationship. 
V. Concluding Remarks: The 1990s. Another Bifurcation? 
When we look a t  the Japanese economy in the 1990s. keeping in 
mind the history described above, we find that at. least two 
significant events occurred during this period, the financial crisis 
and lifting of the ban on holding companies. First. while the 
financial crisis was caused by the decline of banks' monitoring 
capabilities, it weakened the capabilities of banks even further. 
Second, the holding company system has proven to be able to 
work, due to revision of the Antitrust Law in 1997. These events 
suggest that the system of corporate governance in Japan has  been 
faced with a bifurcation, just as it was in the 1920s. If so, will the 
system in Japan converge with the U.S. type? I want to conclude 
this paper with a couple of remarks. 
There remains the problem of how to govern the holding 
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company itself. In pre-war zaibatsu, while the holding compan:y 
governed the affiliated cornpanil-s, the holding company wa:i 
governed by the owners, the zaib.atsu family. It has not yet been 
clarified who will govern the holding company in present-day 
tJapan. Finally, path dependence and institutional complemeni.arit:q 
will, arguably, still work. Firm-specific skills are still the source of 
competitiveness of the Japanese industries, particularly the 
manufacturing industries. Any syst.em of corporate governance that 
compromises this source will not. be able to proliferate. This i:j 
because those firms governed by that system will decline, which, in 
turn, will damage the system itself. In other words, "natural 
selection" mechanism will work to preserve the path-dependent 
nature of the Japanese system (Okazaki 2004). 
(Received 4 November 2004; Reuiseni 10 December 2004) 
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